

CRIMES OF LOYALTY

A HISTORY OF THE UDA

Ian S. Wood



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Edinburgh University Press

With love to Helen, Ben, David and Robbie

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Acknowledgements

This book's title is derived from a dedication often to be seen on paramilitary Loyalist murals in Northern Ireland. It reads 'Their only crime was loyalty' and it usually accompanies names and faces of those killed in the conflict there. Many of them were killers too, though arguably not in a war of their own making.

Loyalty, or Loyalism, can never excuse the terrible killings and the torture which on so many occasions preceded them, and which members of the UDA/UFF carried out once they were convinced, as they often put it to me, of the need to 'fight fire with fire'. Such deeds necessarily occupy much of what follows, but my purpose has been not to excuse but to explain what, in an essentially decent community, drove countless mostly young working-class men to travel their chosen road.

Uppermost in my mind is the thought that no words spoken or written can bring back the dead of Northern Ireland's Troubles nor give comfort to the bereaved. That said, books – and there have been many of them – can help to give us a clearer view of what was, after all, the worst political and ethnic conflict in Europe's experience between 1945 and the break-up of the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.

Irish Republicans did most of the killing by far, and their victims numbered hundreds of Catholics. The UDA, although they took fewer lives than either the IRA or the UVF, were also a brutal combatant over nearly three decades and in these pages I have attempted to tell their story.

Enumerating all those who have helped me in the preparation of this work is a major task but one which must be undertaken here. I have acknowledged at the end of this book all who made themselves available to talk to me and my debt extends to those who did not wish to be identified.

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Ian S. Wood

Introduction

We marched in orderly lines
Thousands of us
Our stars of David sewn on
To our bright new rags
We clutched our possessions
As we marched along
They said our war was over

We sang quietly whilst on the move
Songs that our forefathers sung
And we were proud in the knowledge
That we were Jews
They said the meek would inherit the earth

As they herded us in we saw
The over-head pipes
They said it was to provide heat
But the odour of gas over-whelms us
When we were marching
We should have been fighting

This poem, entitled 'Our Way', was written by Sammy Duddy and appeared in a collection of his work published in Belfast in 1983.¹ The venture was supported by the Ulster Defence Association, in which the author had been active ever since its emergence more than ten years earlier. Andy Tyrrie, the organisation's then commandant, wrote an introduction and the work was dedicated 'To all the long-suffering people of Ulster that they may see the light'.² The author has always said that he wrote 'Our Way' with the thought that Northern Ireland's Loyalist population could, like the Jews of Europe in the Second World War, end up acquiescing in their own fate, not genocide but the extinction of their identity and culture.

Duddy appears briefly in a recent book on Ulster Loyalists which dismisses him as 'Andy Tyrrie's court jester'³ without so much as a reference to his writing. All who have met him would agree that he is excellent company and an unfailing source of good *craic* but his poems capture something of the grief and trauma inflicted by the Troubles on both communities in Northern Ireland. He has escaped death more than once and threats forced him to leave his native

Shankill for a more secure Loyalist area of Belfast. This did not stop him performing a popular drag act in clubs and singing country and western, which he still did in a pub in North Belfast until another attempt on his life was made, early in November 2002, as part of a continuing feud within the UDA.

However, he has continued to work for the UDA, handling much of its publicity and also using his skills as an illustrator and cartoonist. Even when the organisation was drawn into the most brutal counter-terror in response to the IRA, it maintained a community role running advice centres for hard-pressed working-class people as well as for Loyalist prisoners' families. Duddy took his share of this even as the task became a thankless one while Loyalist communities and organisations such as the UDA succumbed to the temptations of crime and drug-dealing.

He has been a strong supporter of the UDA's political initiatives over the years, though realistic about their failure, and welcomes the Combined Loyalist Military Command's October 1994 ceasefire as well as the opportunity to campaign for a 'yes' vote in the 1998 referendum on the Belfast Agreement. If he now has serious doubts about the way that agreement is being implemented, they simply voice those of a community which sees old certainties crumbling amidst a peace process they feel is driven increasingly by an Irish nationalist agenda.

The community with which Duddy identifies does not belong to tennis clubs in Helen's Bay or have holiday access to villas in Tuscany. The people he grew up with and still lives among embody a distinction which has been analysed already, but which still needs to be made, between Ulster Unionists and Ulster Loyalists. These two traditions, it has been forcefully argued, have a clear class dimension: the former are mainly middle class and enjoy careers and lifestyles which have drawn them closer to contemporary 'mainland' British and European norms and values. The latter are a plebeian group whose self-image comprises a now uneasy loyalty to a Britain which they feel no longer understands them nor even wants their allegiance, and a loyalty as deep to their distinctive Ulster Protestant identity.⁴

The tension involved in these loyalties and the shifting relationship between them has been vividly reflected in the history of the UDA, still Northern Ireland's largest Loyalist paramilitary organisation. Thirty years ago it carried Union flags at its marches and rallies. It still does so but now they are outnumbered by Ulster standards and emblems, which also dominate entire localities where there is a UDA presence. Elements within its membership have now reverted to open support for Ulster independence, with which the organisation's leadership associated itself for a time in the 1970s, although in 1998 the UDA's political wing accepted devolved power sharing under the Belfast Agreement.

The Loyalism of the UDA, whether in Belfast housing estates or among the small farmers and traders of rural Antrim and Down is now, more than ever, the value system of those who have nowhere else to go and feel excluded from

a world with little liking for them and even less desire to understand them. 'Late capitalism' has discarded most of them from the shipyards and engineering works where employment was once a badge of their sense of self-worth. They have had little part in the migration 'across the water' of young middle-class Unionists who, in growing numbers, are opting to study in English and Scottish universities and then to stay on after gaining their degrees.

Many Loyalists, left behind and fearful of their future, still identify with the UDA. Why they have done so, and still do, is the subject of this book, which will also explore the shifts and contradictions in UDA political thinking over the last thirty years as well as the organisation's claims to have played an effective military rather than a merely criminal and terrorist role in Northern Ireland's troubles.

NOTES

1. S. Duddy, *Concrete Whirlpools of the Mind* (Belfast: Ulidia, 1983), p. 40.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
3. P. Taylor, *Loyalists* (London: Bloomsbury, 1999), p. 84.
4. S. Bruce, *The Edge of the Union: the Ulster Loyalist Political Vision* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 70–1.

Joining Up: The Origins of the UDA



A pigeon fanciers' club in Leopold Street, off Belfast's Crumlin Road, may seem an odd place of origin for what became Northern Ireland's largest Loyalist paramilitary organisation. Yet David Fogel, a London-born former soldier who had served in Northern Ireland and then settled in Belfast, claimed that a meeting held there in July 1970 led to the formation of the Ulster Defence Association. The period was one of mounting tension. British troops had been on the streets since August of the previous year, when marches for civil rights and the Unionist government's response to them had precipitated serious sectarian violence.

As the Loyalist marching season got under way in the summer of 1970, trouble moved close to the Woodvale area in which Fogel lived with his Belfast-born wife and family. Almost a year earlier they had had to flee for their lives when gunmen had opened fire in the nationalist part of the nearby Ardoyne, but on Saturday, 27 June 1970 a Loyalist band parade along the Springfield Road prompted an attack from Catholic protesters. Bricks and paving stones were hurled at bandsmen and their supporters and soldiers answered with CS gas. Rioting spread quickly and once again live rounds were fired from Ardoyne, killing three Protestants on and near the Crumlin Road. 'In this instance the IRA were ready and waiting,' Gerry Adams later wrote in his memoirs.¹

The shootings provoked a major Loyalist attack on the Short Strand, a small Catholic enclave on the edge of Loyalist East Belfast, and they made a deep impression on Fogel. 'A couple of days later', he recalled, 'I went along to join a group of men who were angry about it. All we were hearing about and reading was how the Catholics were getting a raw deal. Everything was being done to appease them. Yet there was all this violence. Law and order seemed to be taking a back seat.'² The meeting was in the 'pigeon house' as local people called it but Fogel was not impressed. 'I thought it was pathetic. Most of them were middle-aged men and all they were doing was moaning and exchanging rumours. It was all talk.'³

Fogel interrupted proceedings to say that mere talk was not enough. He impressed Charles Harding Smith, the man who had called the meeting and who lived only two streets away from the club. Harding Smith was an ex-shipyard worker who had become a tyre salesman working with his brother-in-law. He

told Fogel what he wanted to hear, that Loyalists needed military training, and Fogel promised to recruit twenty local men, each of whom would bring a friend, for basic drill with dummy weapons as well as unarmed combat sessions and fieldcraft instruction in the country. 'It would be dishonest to pretend that real guns didn't exist,' Fogel said later. 'There were shotguns, legally held, too. We didn't have any illegal weapons then. We knew the shotguns would be used if the IRA came into our territory.'⁴

This was the beginning of the Woodvale Defence Association. Loyalists in other localities followed its example in response to increasing IRA attacks and their own growing doubts about British policy. Fogel, apart from his London accent, was typical of the many who 'joined up' at this time. After leaving the army he had worked as a machinist in Mackies' engineering plant but was made redundant in 1970 and lived off casual work when he could get it or unemployment benefit to pay rent on his house in Palmer Street, Woodvale. He talked later of a life not so different from that of the 'other side', a phrase Loyalists were using increasingly that year.

Like most of the Catholics in the Falls – like half the working class in Britain – our house was small and old. It was the one thing we had in common with the Catholics.

The parlour was a front room, leading straight off the street, with a scullery at the back, two bedrooms upstairs and an outside lavatory, no bathroom – for that we had to go round to the mother-in-law's.⁵

Andy Tyrrie, who would rise to overall command of what became the Ulster Defence Association, grew up on the Shankill as one of a family of nine occupying a two-bedroom house. His father was an ex-soldier and his mother often took in sewing to supplement their income. He took whatever factory work he could get and found himself being drawn into the worsening conflict in 1970 and 1971.

His mother's finished needlework, he recalled, would often be sold at stalls on the Falls Road owned by Catholic traders. 'There was a close working relationship between the two communities. Even when the Troubles began the difference between the two communities was not overbearing in any way.'⁶ Fear, as the situation worsened, forced Tyrrie to define himself in terms represented by his father's military service and his own in the Territorial Army. In 1970 he was living in the new Moyard estate in West Belfast, but it provided no refuge from sectarian conflict and he joined a local group which sought to handle the problems of families fleeing into Moyard from other localities.

What I found behind the scenes was that everything was being done to block Protestants from getting houses in the area. Protestants were being encouraged to leave the district and I became suspicious of people involved in house allocation. At one time I actually set up road blocks on my own and refused to let outsiders into the area. Things got really tough in my area and it soon became a focal point

for attacks on Protestant homes. We formed a defence group for all the Protestants of the area. I still believed that there was no reason why the two communities couldn't live together – but there were people who were not playing fair.⁷

Sammy Duddy also came from a large family. He grew up with eight brothers and sisters in the Hammer area of Belfast. He retells how, when on a childhood visit to the city's zoo, his parents asked for eleven admission tickets. The man in the zoo replied: 'Hold on a minute and we'll bring the animals out to see you.'⁸ Duddy senior was a Londonderry man who had settled in Belfast and served in the RUC's B-Special reserve during the Second World War. He worked as a letterpress printer, a trade to which Sammy himself was apprenticed at the age of fifteen.

While still at school he had shown an aptitude for writing and would, on occasions, compose personalised Valentines for classmates in return for pens or Dinky cars. A sample of his work in this period, which he still quotes, reads as follows:

I held your hand in class today,
My mates think I'm a fool.
But you've a thirty six inch bust
And I've a six inch tool.⁹

Later he would both edit and contribute to UDA magazines as well as doing cartoons and illustrations for them, but, like many others, he initially joined a local defence association. 'It was vigilante stuff when things were hotting up, checkpoints and baseball bats.'¹⁰

Other very similar defence associations were formed during the remainder of 1970 and many more the following year as the IRA launched a series of attacks on the police and the army. These attacks took civilian lives as well and over a hundred deaths in 1971 were the work of Republican paramilitaries. Internment without trial was introduced as a desperate measure which did nothing to reduce the violence. The nationalists launched a civil disobedience campaign while Unionism drifted further into crisis with James Chichester-Clark resigning as Prime Minister in March. That month also saw the start of large protest marches, orchestrated by the Loyalist Association of Workers (LAW), whose leaders called for draconian security measures against the IRA.

Amid this escalating violence, paramilitary Loyalism on the Woodvale model remained localised and fragmented, each group assuming responsibility only for the defence of its own area. The worsening security situation impressed upon a growing number of activists the need for contact and co-operation among different vigilante groups. Meetings to bring this about began in the summer of 1971 and Ingram Beckett, a dock worker from the Shankill, chaired one of the first meetings, in a Northland Street band hall, at which the name Ulster Defence Association was used. By January of 1972 a

structure was beginning to emerge as well as a hierarchy of ranks within designated brigade and battalion areas.

When Duddy took his decision to join he had to present himself at a community centre near his home. A table was covered with a Union flag, on which lay a bible and a Sterling submachine gun. Not all present with him took the membership oath. The open display of a firearm deterred some from taking a major step beyond mere street defence work but Duddy was willing to be sworn in, believing that Loyalists now needed guns for their own protection.¹¹ Enough men in Duddy's locality and elsewhere joined with him for the new organisation to acquire a visible and formidable strength.

Alec Calderwood was far too young to join the UDA at this time, though he did so later and in 1982 received a life sentence for the brutal murder of a young Catholic. He was only seven years old in 1969 when British troops were deployed on Belfast's streets. He was born in Brown Square, off the Lower Shankill Road, 'a lovely wee community then, where you could leave your doors open, day and night, and you'd never get burgled'.¹² He earned his life-long nickname, Oso, because he was often seen waiting for an ice cream van with the name 'Mr Oso' painted on it. He was already in a junior Orange lodge when the Troubles started and Brown Square found itself in range of attack from the nationalist side of the army's rapidly built peace line.

What the Troubles really meant for him, however, was the presence of a company of the Royal Highland Fusiliers who were based in the Brown Square RUC station.

I became their mascot. They let me into the station to make toast and tea for them. They bought me toys and they used to give me bread, butter and cheese to take home to my ma. Then there was the news that three of them had been shot dead, not any of the boys in Brown Square. I just went away and cried.¹³

These were the March 1971 killings of three young Scots off duty from their battalion who were lured by an Ardoyne IRA unit from a city centre pub to their execution on a lonely road in North Belfast. 'People started to say it was the IRA and I'd say: 'Who are they?' The answer would be: "They're Fenians." I started to want revenge for those boys.'¹⁴ He had to wait for it, finally being accepted by the Lower Shankill UDA in 1978. He could neither read nor write, having been suspended from school at the age of eleven and a half for hitting a teacher with a chair. He stresses he was not the only one to emerge illiterate from Belfast's schools.

Calderwood still says he would rather have joined the Ulster Volunteer Force.

They had something special, a mystique if you like. But I was from a big family, I had two sisters and four brothers. There were too many family already in the UDA for me not to join. That was it really. There was only the one way for me to

go after what had happened, the things I've told you about and what our community had gone through.¹⁵

Four or five miles away in the Braniel housing estate in east Belfast, a tough and streetwise teenager called Michael Stone also joined up. Brought up in the area by an uncle and aunt he has described as hard-working and affectionate to him, he had got into trouble at school and given up a shipyard apprenticeship after rising to a leadership role in one of the area's tartan gangs. Some of these had as many as 150 members and identified themselves by tartan scarves or patches on their denim jackets. This was possibly in tribute to the three very young Royal Highland Fusiliers whose deaths had such an impact on Calderwood, though they may also have been copying the Scottish rock band the Bay City Rollers.

The gang's forays into Catholic areas and Stone's relish for violence attracted the attention of the local UDA and its leader, Tommy Herron, but joining was not a problem. Stone had been deeply affected by the way a cousin who lived with and looked after sick and ailing parents had been evicted from his home in Ardoyne in the summer of 1971 by a vengeful Republican crowd. 'This sectarian attack on my family sowed the seeds of hatred and resentment that would stay with me for most of my adult life,' he wrote later.¹⁶ As IRA attacks grew in indiscriminate ferocity, such as the bombing of a restaurant in Belfast's Cornmarket in March 1972, in which a young mother who was a family friend died of terrible injuries, Stone knew that he 'was on a path of no return, that would eventually take me to prison, or to my death'.¹⁷

Shortly afterwards Stone reported at a rendezvous on the edge of East Belfast with four other prospective UDA volunteers. Herron was there to meet them, and Stone, having been in the Army Cadet Force, was able to impress him by the ease with which he could dismantle, reassemble and load a 9mm Star revolver. The real test, however, which only Stone passed, was to use the weapon to kill a friendly Alsatian dog which Herron had brought with him. 'If you couldn't kill the dog, then you're not capable of killing a human being',¹⁸ Herron remarked as he took his leave, and Stone was sworn in to full membership the following week. His exploits would, in time, make him a figure of iconic status within the UDA.

Others, like Stone, joined the UDA in response to particular atrocities, sometimes ones which they had witnessed themselves. On 11 December 1971, at the height of a busy Saturday on the Shankill Road, the IRA, in revenge for a terrible Loyalist bombing of a Catholic bar, McGurk's, on North Queen Street a week earlier, planted a no-warning bomb in the Balmoral furniture store. The explosion brought most of the building down and hundreds of people dug at the rubble with their bare hands alongside police and troops in search of survivors. Of four victims killed, two were children aged two years and one year respectively. People still living in the area will talk even now of the young men they knew who joined Loyalist paramilitary organisations in

the rage and fear which followed this attack. One who did, according to his son, was Tommy Lyttle, who later became a brigadier in the UDA.¹⁹

John White felt there was only one answer to acts like these: 'I'd seen the results of IRA operations, babies, children, pensioners beheaded, blown apart. I thought we should fight fire with fire.'²⁰ White, who, eighteen months later, committed two of the most frenzied and sadistic murders in Northern Ireland's Troubles, grew up with a large family on Belfast's Old Lodge Road. He had seven brothers and sisters, two of whom died young, and his father was an invalid from war wounds.

My home wasn't a Loyalist one in a political sense but my father hated Catholics. He wouldn't have any in the house, even when one of my brothers had a Catholic girlfriend. Often he would talk of the Free State's treachery to Britain in the war in which of course he had served.²¹

The UDA for him initially was street defence. The family had left their home in the New Barnsley estate after the outbreak of the Troubles had turned the area into a dangerous 'interface'. After that, he describes his role as 'vigilante stuff, balaclavas, pick handles, all that',²² though he held on to a job, having served an apprenticeship as a joiner. When, in June 1973, the Ulster Freedom Fighters emerged as the new cutting edge of UDA counter-terror, White was one of its founders and ready to kill for it.

Other Loyalists had already begun their journey down that road and some works on the Troubles attribute killings to members of the UDA well before it was formed. This of course is not to deny that murders were committed by Loyalists who later joined its ranks, and by the early months of 1972 it was 'outkilling' the UVF. This latter organisation, with a pedigree stretching back to the 1912 Home Rule crisis, proud of its ex-service ethos, secretive and disciplined, never aspired to a mass membership after its re-emergence in the mid-1960s. It soon brought the gun back to Belfast's streets, well ahead of the crisis arising from the Civil Rights Campaign. This fact has constantly been pressed into service by Republicans anxious to deny that Loyalist violence has simply been a reaction to their own and to argue that it has been more a response to the threat of political change.²³

It is true that the first sectarian killings of the 1960s, if the final phase of the IRA's border campaign is left out, were indeed the work of Loyalists. These, however, were few in number and although Civil Rights and People's Democracy marches were physically attacked, a well-armed Loyalist community did not use guns against them.²⁴ The real escalation in Loyalist violence only came once it was clear that the IRA had embarked upon an all-out and indiscriminate offensive against the security forces and the majority community. Once this became a reality, UDA members, especially in 1972 and 1973, were responsible for many more killings than the UVF, which had suffered heavily from arrests of its members after the 1966 Malvern Street murder, for which Gusty Spence was convicted. It only reappeared with any capacity to

kill in 1971 and most of its victims that year died in one single bombing, that of McGurk's bar.

Any analysis of Loyalist violence has to be linked carefully to the chronology of political events. When Britain suspended Stormont in late March 1972 and imposed direct government on Northern Ireland, it dealt a severe and lasting blow to the self-esteem of Ulster Loyalism and Unionism more generally. UDA killings in response to it and to continued IRA attacks intensified both in number and in the ferocity with which they were carried out. The journalist John Whale, a shrewd interpreter of the Troubles as they unfolded, was alert to the connection. 'Just as the Provisional IRA had been a response to pre-emptive violence used by the forces of order,' he wrote, 'so the UDA, though it had a long ancestry in Ulster history, was still at this stage a defensive reaction to violence from the Republican side. If that violence had ended then, when Stormont did, the UDA would certainly have remained watchful, but its growth would have been checked.'²⁵

Even amidst mounting violence and with the ground shifting politically under Loyalists' feet, joining one organisation rather than another did require a choice, as David Ervine recalled more than thirty years later. He decided it had to be the UVF after Bloody Friday, 21 July 1972, when, with minimal warning to the emergency services, the IRA set off twenty bombs in Belfast in just over an hour. Television viewers the same evening saw RUC officers scraping human remains into plastic bags outside the Oxford Street bus depot, one of the targets. Nine people died and 130 were injured.

The UDA was too loose and disparate for my liking. They took time to cohere from the original area defence associations. I was never too keen either on the street drills they went in for. The UVF had its own mystique. It was family history too as my grandfather had been in it. Mind you, lots of good lads I knew in East Belfast did join the UDA and that was never a problem for me. We all had to choose and we were all caught in a groundswell of feeling, of fear.²⁶

Ervine was right about the UDA's preoccupation with open drilling on the streets. This was of course a way of both demonstrating its presence and providing footage for camera crews from the world's media but it was not all just show. In Woodvale, with David Fogel second in command to Charles Harding Smith, the local UDA unit entered 1972 with 150 members and trebled that number over the next twelve months. They exchanged fire with the IRA for the first time in December 1971 and Fogel looked after the instruction of new recruits: 'I taught them about unarmed combat – you know, how to break a nose, burst an ear drum, dislocate a spine.'²⁷ But he also set up lectures on police and army interrogation methods and urban guerrilla tactics.

Harding Smith's rise within the organisation was rapid. His power base in Woodvale was a strong one and by early 1972 he was speaking for it as chairman of its governing council, representing six brigade areas. As the security situation worsened he became convinced that the priority for the UDA was

to expand and modernise its firepower. In April he and White went to London to make contact with arms dealers, claiming the funds were already there to cover major purchases. Recruitment continued in his absence and Fogel decided that, in response to the creation of a growing number of 'no-go' areas in the city controlled by the IRA, Loyalists must show their hand.

This appears to have been a decision he was able to make himself because Harding Smith and White were arrested in London at the end of April and charged with illegal purchase of arms. Jim Anderson, who ran a glazier's business on the Crumlin Road, took over as acting chairman and fully supported Fogel, who organised the sealing off of Woodvale with barricades and roadblocks at the end of May. Army and police units were as reluctant to act as they were in response to similar IRA initiatives and it was a triumph for Fogel.

Before then we had been written off as a bunch of loonies: toy soldiers playing with wooden guns and crawling over fields in so-called training. Training for what, I used to be asked. That no-go area showed them. For the first time, ordinary Protestants were doing something for themselves.²⁸

Press and camera crews gave the operation maximum coverage, as Fogel had hoped they would: 'After that there was no stopping us. In June three of us drove up to Stormont to see Willie Whitelaw, the British Cabinet Minister [who had been appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland when direct rule was announced on 24 March]. That same month we marched 23,000 strong and twelve abreast through the centre of Belfast.'²⁹ In fact, the new secretary of state was not initially over-impressed by Fogel and his fellow governing council members. 'I met the UDA leaders in mid-June,' he wrote in his memoirs. 'They arrived looking quite absurd in hoods and sunglasses.'³⁰

Whitelaw made it clear that any further attempts to set up permanent barricades by the UDA would not be permitted and he left the meeting believing that such action would be postponed. The threat of more no-go areas was, however, renewed at the end of the month in Ainsworth Avenue, off the Shankill Road, at the height of which Fogel, Andy Tyrrie and other UDA leaders negotiated directly with an army general. The full implications of this episode and its outcome will be examined in a later chapter which covers the UDA's paramilitary role and its relationship to the security forces.

Fogel's prestige on the Shankill soared as a result of the role he had played.

I was big Dave. I even had two bodyguards who went everywhere with me. I was a bit of everything in those streets – policeman, magistrate, and welfare worker. I sometimes presided at unofficial courts. We bashed faces in if we thought someone guilty of, say, house breaking. There wasn't much trouble though.

I've never been so busy. The parlour of our house was always full, neighbours, men from the UDA and Pressmen from all over the world. We even gave cups of tea to American Congressmen.³¹

The exercise by the UDA of a policing role in areas where the RUC's writ had for the time being ceased to run began to be of concern to Unionist politicians. Their concern grew as rumours spread about the extent of the organisation's fundraising and the way it was being carried out. White added fuel to the rumours when he told a broadcaster early in 1972 that raising £250,000 for arms purchases 'would be no great problem'.³²

Wary as they may have been, Unionists could from early in the UDA's existence find themselves accepting its protection. James Molyneaux, a Unionist MP who later became party leader, found himself in this position early in July 1972 in Lisburn, when he attended the town's commemoration of the battle of the Somme and the sacrifice there of the Ulster Division. The parade organisers had been warned by the security forces of a possible IRA attack and of the only limited protection they could offer. A recently formed UDA unit from Dunmurry in South Belfast offered to line what it felt was the most vulnerable stretch of the parade route and marched into the town centre in order to do so.

Molyneaux and other Unionists and Orangemen leading the parade felt that they had at least to acknowledge the UDA's presence.

You had the feeling that they knew you and vice versa, on Christian name terms. If they had taken off the masks most of the officers [he meant senior office bearers in lodges on the parade] and I would have recognised them. It was that type of contradictory position. They felt they had to band together to protect their community. However, even at the back of my mind, I was wondering, will somebody be able to keep control of all this?³³

Apart from its increasingly visible presence on the streets and the intensifying attacks its members were launching on the nationalist community, the UDA in this period also issued a proliferating array of leaflets, bulletins and news-sheets to publicise and explain its role. Some of these ran for only a few issues. Others survive, undated. Often they were cyclostyled in the most basic way and proof-checking could be minimal. Yet these publications, brought out in haste and in response to rapid and violent changes, as well as ordinary people's contributions to them, remain a vivid and sometimes moving source on the anxieties and fears, even if crudely and brutally expressed, of a community which in a short space of time had seen all its old certainties turned upside down.

Symptomatic of this was the decision in July 1972 by the new Northern Ireland Office that there should be no 12 July parades. This was because of the communal violence caused by some major parades since August 1969 and because controlling processional routes would severely over-stretch the security forces. UDA publications called in vain for Orange lodges to resist this decision and forecast that new leaders would emerge within the Order to defy the authorities. Not all UDA members were Orangemen but they grasped the symbolism of the decision: 'The Twelfth without the marches is like a